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Abstract
This paper explores the role of consumption externalities in an overlapping gen-
erations economy with capital accumulation. If consumers in each generation are
concerned with other agents’ consumption behaviors, there exist intergenerational as
well as intragenerational consumption externalities. It is the presence of intergen-
reational consumption externalities that may produce fundamental effects both on
equilibrium dynamics and on steady-state characterization of the economy. This pa-
per demonstrates this fact in the context of a simple model of endogenously growing,
overlapping-generations economy with or without asset bubbles.
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1 Introduction
Recently, there has been a renewed interest in the role of consumption externalities in
macroeconomics. Earlier studies on this issue such as Abel (1990) and Galí (1994) in-
troduce consumption external effects into the asset pricing models in order to resolve the
discrepancies between theoretical outcomes and empirical findings. Those studies, there-
fore, focus on the external effects of consumption on the individual decision making or on
the behavior of asset markets. In contrast, the recent investigations on macroeconomic
implications of consumption externalities examine the issue in the dynamic, general equi-
librium models with capital accumulation and discuss a wider range of topics than those
considered by the earlier studies. For example, the recent studies have explored the effect
of consumption externalities on optimal taxation (Ljungqvist and Uhlig 2000), equilibrium
efficiency (Alonso-Carrera et al. 2003 and Liu and Turnovsky 2005), indeterminacy and
sunspots (Weder 2000), and on the relationship between savings and long-term economic
growth (Carroll et al. 1997 and 2000, and Harbaugh 1996).1
A common feature of the existing investigations on consumption externalities in the
macroeconomics literature is that most of them employ the representative agent models.
In general, introduction of consumption externalities into the standard representative-
agent models of growth and business cycles does not produce significant qualitative effects
on dynamic behavior of the model economy: see Liu and Turnovsky (2005) for a detailed
discussion on equilibrium dynamics of the standard representative agent model with con-
sumption externalities. Although consumption externalities may yield large quantitative
effects that would be relevant for welfare implications and policy making decisions, the
dynamic properties and the steady-state characterization of the model economies are usu-
ally the same as those of models without consumption external effects. Such a conclusion
1Some of the existing studies such as Ljunavust and Uhlig (2000) and Carroll et al. (1997 and 2000)
assume the external habit formation in which the benchmark consumption is given by a weighted average
of past levels of the average consumption in the economy. Unlike the internal habit formation, consumers
consider that the benchmark consumption is not affected by their own consumption behavior under the
external habit formation hypothesis. Thus this assumption represents consumption externalities with
time delay rather than (internal) habit formation under which each agent takes its past consumption into
account when deciding its optimal saving plans.
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is in contrast to the effect of production externalities, which may alter the behavior of the
economy in fundamental ways.
Departing from the mainstream studies mentioned above, we examine the role of con-
sumption external effects in an overlapping generations (OLG) economy. We extend the
standard two-period-lived OLG model of capital accumulation by introducing external
effects among consumption activities of the agents. A relevant difference between the rep-
resentative agent and the OLG settings is that the contemporaneous external effects of
consumption involve the intergenerational as well as intragenerational externalities in the
OLG economy. Unlike the representative agent economy, heterogeneity of agents inevitably
exists in the OLG economy, and hence contemporaneous interactions among consumption
activities of the agents would be more complex in the OLG economy than those in the
representative-agent economy. This suggests that the presence of consumption externali-
ties generates more fundamental effects both on equilibrium dynamics and on the long-run
equilibrium in the OLG setting than in the representative-agent counterpart. The central
purpose of this paper is to confirm this prediction by using a simple growth model of an
OLG economy.
More specifically, we develop an endogenous-growth version of Diamond’s (1965) model
with consumption externalities. We first examine the real economy in the absence of asset
bubbles. It is shown that the balanced-growth equilibrium and transitional dynamics de-
pend heavily on the preference structure that characterizes forms of consumption external
effects. For example, if consumers have jealousy as to other agents’ consumption so that
there are negative consumption externalities and if consumers are conformists, then there
is a unique balanced-growth path that satisfies global determinacy. However, if the con-
sumers are conformists but they have admiration as to others’ consumption, then there
may exist dual balanced-growth equilibria. Similarly, if consumers are anti-conformists
and if intrageneratioanl external effect is sufficiently strong, then dual balanced-growth
paths may exist as well. It is shown that in these cases of dual steady states, the long-run
equilibrium with a higher growth rate is locally indeterminate, while the steady state with
a lower growth rate exhibits local determinacy.
We then investigate the equilibrium dynamics of the model economy in the presence
of asset bubbles. As shown by Grossman and Yanagawa (1993), an OLG economy with
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endogenous growth may sustain the balanced-growth path with bubbles, if and only if the
balanced-growth rate of bubble-free economy exceeds the real interest rate.2 Thus the
presence of bubble lowers the long-term growth rate, because the balanced-growth rate
in the presence of bubbles is fixed at the rate of return to capital. It is also known that
the steady state with bubbles is locally determinate and the bubble-free steady state is
locally indeterminate. We show that those results established in the standard framework
still hold, if there are only intragenerational consumption externalities. However, if there
also exist intergenerational consumption externalities, we may obtain different outcomes.
In particular, the growth effect of bubbles and the conditions for sustaining bubbles are
considerably modified in the presence of intergenerational consumption externalities. Since
we will assume that supply of nominal asset grows at a constant rate, the balanced-growth
path with bubbles is uniquely determined. Therefore, even if the corresponding bubble-
free economy involves dual steady states, introducing bubbles yields a unique long-term
equilibrium. It is shown that in the presence of consumption externalities the growth rate
in the steady state with bubbles may or may not exceed the growth rate attained in the
bubble-free equilibrium. We also confirm that the economy exhibits global indeterminacy
in the sense that every balanced-growth path (with or without bubbles) and a transitional
trajectory leading to one of the stable balanced-growth equilibria can be a perfect-foresight
competitive equilibrium.
It is to be noted that several authors have examined the roles of consumption exter-
nalities in OLG models. Among others, Abel (2005) introduces both intergenerational
and intragenerational consumption externalities into the Diamond model of overlapping
generations. The basic model structure of his article is thus close to ours. The central
concern of Abel (2005) is to characterize the optimal income taxation in the steady-state
equilibrium. Alonso-Carrera et al. (2005) also use a model similar to Abel’s (2005) in
order to investigate how the presence of consumption externalities affects the bequest mo-
tives of altruistic agents. In addition, de la Croix (1996) examines an OLG model where
the parents’ consumption behavior is inherited by their children and thus there is one-way
2 In the context of an infinitely-lived overlapping generations model, Futagami and Shibata (1999)
pointed out that this result may not hold, if supply of useless asset is not constant. In Section 4.1 we
reconfirm this fact in our setting.
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intergenerational external effect.3 Since neither equilibrium dynamics with endogenous
growth nor asset bubbles are out of touch in the existing studies mentioned above, the
contribution of this paper is to present a new insight on the role of consumption external-
ities in macroeconomic dynamics that has not been fully explored in the literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the analytical framework.
Section 3 discusses equilibrium dynamics of the model economy in the absence of asset
bubbles. Section 4 introduces asset bubbles into the base model and considers the role of
consumption externalities in characterizing long-run equilibrium that may sustain bubbles.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Base Model
In this section, we construct the base model that depicts growth dynamics without bubbles.
The analytical framework we use is an endogenous-growth version of Diamond’s (1965)
model. We extend the baseline model by assuming that felicity of an individual consumers
in each generation depends not only on her own consumption but also on the benchmark
consumption represented by the average level of consumption in the economy at large.
2.1 Households
We consider a two-period-lived overlapping generations economy where in each period only
two types of agents are alive: young and old. Agents are identical within the generation.
Population is constant over time and the number of agents in each generation is normalized
to one. The utility function of agents in cohort born at the beginning of period t is
Ut = u (ct, Et) + βu (xt+1, Et+1) , 0 < β < 1,
where ct denotes consumption when the agents are young, xt+1 is consumption when they
are old, and β denotes a given discount factor. In the above, Et and Et+1 denote the
benchmark levels of consumption that express external effects on the felicities in period
3See also de la Croix and Michel (2002). Using the term, ’external habit’, de la Croix’s (1996) for-
mulation represents itntergenerational, external habit formation. Lahiri and Puhakka (1998) examine a
two-period-lived overlapping generations economy with internal habit formation.
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t and t + 1, respectively. We assume that the benchmark level of consumption in each
period depends on the average consumption levels of existing generations:
Et = E
0 (c¯t, x¯t) , Et+1 = E
1 (x¯t+1, c¯t+1) ,
where c¯t+s and x¯t+s (s = 0, 1) respectively denote the average consumption of young and
old agents in period t+ s. Notice that since we have assumed that the number of agent in
each cohort is normalized to one, in equilibrium the average level of consumption of each
agent equals its private level:
c¯t = ct, x¯t = xt for all t ≥ 0. (1)
For analytical simplicity, we specify the instantaneous utility function in each period
as follows:
u (ct, Et) =
³
ctE
−θ
t
´1−σ
1− σ , u (xt+1, Et+1) =
³
xt+1E
−θ
t+1
´1−σ
1− σ , σ > 0, σ 6= 1, θ < 1. (2)
We also specify the reference levels of consumption in such a way that
E0 (c¯t, x¯t) = c¯
γ
t x¯
1−γ
t , E
1 (x¯t+1, c¯t+1) = x¯
γ
t+1c¯
1−γ
t+1 , 0 < γ ≤ 1. (3)
Namely, we assume that the felicity of each agent depends on the weighted geometric
mean of consumption levels of all consumers. In this specification, γ denotes the relative
strength between the intragenerational and intergenerational external effects.4 Note that
when γ = 1, the external effects are generated by the average consumption of the same
4An alternative specification of the utility function that has been frequently used in the literature is
Ut =
(ct − θEt)1−σ
1− σ + β
(xt+1 − θEt+1)1−σ
1− σ
where
Et = ct + γxt, Et+1 = xt+1 + γct+1.
Mino (2004) use this specification to analyze equilibrium dynamics of an OLG model with the neoclassical
production technology. Alonso-Carrera et al. (2005) use a slightly more general form such that
Ut =
?
ct − θEδt
?1−σ
1− σ + β
?
xt+1 − θEδt+1
?1−σ
1− σ .
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cohort alone. Given (3) , the instantaneous utility function in each period is written as
u
¡
ct, E
0 (c¯t, x¯t)
¢
=
"
c1−θt
µ
ct
c¯t
¶θγ µ ct
x¯t
¶θ(1−γ)#1−σ
1− σ ,
u
¡
xt+1, E
1 (x¯t+1, c¯t+1)
¢
=
"
x1−θt+1
µ
xt+1
x¯t+1
¶θγ µxt+1
c¯t+1
¶θ(1−γ)#1−σ
1− σ .
These expressions show that the felicity of t-th generation in each period depends on
the intragenerational and intergenerational relative consumption levels as well as on the
absolute level of its own consumption.
If external effects are internalized so that the conditions in (1) holds, the social level
of marginal utility of private consumption is given by
uc
¡
ct, E
0 (ct, xt)
¢
= (1− θγ) c−θγ−σ(1−θγ)t x
−θ(1−γ)(1−σ)
t .
In addition, we see that
sign ucc = sign {− (1− θγ) (σ + γθ (1− σ))} .
The same conditions hold for u
¡
xt+1, E
1 (xt+1, ct+1)
¢
. In order to make the social marginal
utility of consumption is positive and decreasing, we assume that
1− θγ > 0 and σ + γθ (1− σ) > 0. (4)
If 0 < θ < 1, the above conditions are satisfied. If θ < 0,we need to assume that σ +
θγ (1− σ) > 0.
Following the taxonomy given by Dupor and Liu (2003), if an agent’s felicity depends
both on the average consumption in the economy at large and on her own consumption,
the presence of negative external effect means that the consumer has jealousy as to other
agents’ consumption, while the consumer has admiration for consumption of others if her
felicity is positively related to the social level of consumption. Moreover, if the marginal
utility of private consumption increases with the social level of consumption, consumers
prefer being similar to others (Keeping Up with the Joneses: KUJ). In contrast, if the
marginal utility of private consumption decreases with the social level of consumption,
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consumers want to be different from others (Running Away from the Joneses: RAJ).
Using our notation, ∂u/∂E < 0 means jealousy and ∂u/∂E > 0 expresses admiration.
Similarly, ∂2u/∂c∂E > 0 indicates KUJ, while consumers’ preference satisfies RAJ, if
∂2u/∂c∂E < 0. Given the utility function (2) , we see that
sign uE
µ
≡ ∂u
∂E
¶
= sign (−θ) , sign ucE
µ
≡ ∂
2u
∂c∂E
¶
= sign {−θ (1− σ)} .
Thus the consumer’s preference satisfies KUJ if θ (1− σ) < 0, while her preference exhibits
RAJ if θ (1− σ) > 0.
An alternative expression for KUJ (resp. RAJ) is conformism (resp. non-conformism).
Collier (2004) defines the ’degree of conformism’ in the following manner:
Λ (c, E) =
dc
dE
¯¯¯¯
uc= const
= −ucE
ucc
= θ
µ
σ − 1
σ
¶
c
E
.
This gives the relation between the benchmark and private levels of consumption with
keeping the marginal utility of private consumption constant. If Λ (c, E) has a negative
value, then a higher benchmark consumption reduces private consumption under a given
marginal utility of private consumption. This is equivalent to the RAJ condition. Con-
versely, if Λ (c, E) > 0, conformism dominates the consumers’ behavior. In particular, if
Λ (c, E) > 1, then consumers are over-conformists.5 It is worth pointing out that in the
representative agent economy where E = c in equilibrium, the degree of conformism is
determined by the preferences parameters, σ and θ, alone. In the overlapping generations
economy where the equilibrium level of benchmark consumption, E, may diverge from c,
the degree of conformism is also affected by the relative consumption, c/E. Since con-
formism and non (anti)-conformism are more straightforward expressions than KUJ and
RAJ, in what follows we use the former terms.
5By definition, Λ (c,E) > 1 means that ucc + ucE > 0.If this is the case, conformism is so strong to
cancel decreasing marginal utility of private consumption. This situation has been excluded in most of the
existing studies on consumption externalities in macroeconomics.
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In sum, we have four possibilities displayed in Table 1 :
σ > 1 σ < 1
θ > 0 jealousy, conformist jealousy, non-conformist
θ < 0 admiration, non-conformist admiration, conformist
Table 1: Classification of the preference structure
In the existing literature on consumption externalities in macroeconomic dynamics, it
has been common to assume that the consumer’s preference exhibits jealousy and con-
formism. Although jealousy and conformism may be frequently observed in reality, we
also examine other cases in order to consider how the analytical conclusions are related to
the specifications of preference structure.
The consumer’s intertemporal decision is basically the same as that in Diamond (1965).
We assume that agents in each cohort work only when they are young. Hence, their flow
budget constraint in their young and old ages are respectively given by
wt = ct + st and xt+1 = Rt+1st,
where wt is the real wage rate, st is saving of the young agent and Rt+1 denotes the gross
rate of interest in period t+ 1. The intertemporal budget constraint for the household is
written as
ct +
xt+1
Rt+1
= wt. (5)
The agents born at the beginning of period t select ct and xt+1 to maximize Ut subject
to the life-time budget constraint of (5) . When solving their optimization problem, the
agents take the benchmark levels of consumption, Et and Et+1, as given. The first-order
conditions for an optimum yieldsµ
ct
xt+1
¶−σ
= βRt+1
µ
Et
Et+1
¶θ(1−σ)
. (6)
Therefore, unless σ = 1, the marginal rate of substitution between consumption when
young and old is determined by the relative magnitudes of external effects, Et/Et+1, and
by the rate of interest, Rt+1. Using thd consistency conditions in (1) and substituting (3)
and (6) into (6) , we obtain the following:µ
ct
xt+1
¶−[σ+γθ(1−σ)]
= βRt+1
µ
xt
ct+1
¶θ(1−γ)(1−σ)
. (7)
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This equation shows that the marginal rate of substitution between young and old-age
consumption from the social perspective is related to the rate of return to capital in period
t+1 and the relative consumption, xt/ct+1, which represents the intergenerational external
effects. Note that, given the external effects, the relative consumption ct/xt+1 from the
private perspective decreases with the rate of return, Rt+1. Similarly, under the restrictions
in (4) , the relation between the relative consumption from the social perspective is also
negatively related to the real interest rate.
2.2 Production
We assume that the economy has an Ak technology that can sustain endogenous growth.
Firms produce a single commodity in a competitive market. The private technology of
production satisfies constant returns to scale with respect to capital and labor. Suppose
that there are many identical firms. The number of firms is normalized to one. The
production function of each firm is given by
yt = Ak
α
t
¡
ltk¯t
¢1−α
, 0 < α < 1,
where yt, lt and kt respectively denote output, labor and capital of an individual firm.
Additionally, k¯t is the aggregate capital which equals kt in the symmetric equilibrium. If
we assume that each young agent supplies one unit of labor so that lt = 1, the aggregate
production function is expressed as yt = Akαt k¯
1−α
t .
6
6Alternatively, we may assume that the production technology is given by
yt = Ak
α
t h
1−α
t , 0 < α < 1,
where ht denotes human capital. If we assume that physical and human capital earn the same rate of
return in a competitive environment, it should hold that
∂yt
∂kt
=
∂yt
∂ht
,
which means that the optimal factor choice gives h = (1− α) k/α. Therefore, the production function is
written as
yt = Aˆk,
where Aˆ =
?
1−α
α
?1−α
. The analytical results based on this formulation is the same as those obtained in
our setting. Only difference is that the above model does not involve production externalities so that there
is no inefficiency in the production side of the economy.
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The final good market is assumed to be competitive. Thus, the net rate of return
to capital, rt, and the real wage rate, wt, are respectively given by rt = αyt/kt − δ and
wt = (1− α) yt, where δ denotes the rate of depreciation of capital. Due to the arbitrage
condition, the gross rate of interest satisfies Rt = rt + 1. In the following, we assume that
capital fully depreciates in one period, that is, δ = 1 so that Rt = αyt/kt. (This is a
plausible assumption in the two-period lived OLG economy in which one period may be
25 years long.).
The symmetric equilibrium requires that k¯t = kt. Therefore, the social technology that
internalizes the external effect is written as follows:
yt = Akt. (8)
Similarly, the competitive levels of gross rate of return to capital and the real wage rate
are respectively given by
Rt = αA ≡ R, (9)
wt = (1− α)Akt. (10)
2.3 Commodity Market Equilibrium Condition
In each period the final goods are used for consumption and investment, so that
yt = ct + xt + kt+1. (11)
Since we have assumed that only young agents save, capital formation is determined by
kt+1 = st = wt − ct. (12)
3 Growth without Bubbles
3.1 The Dynamic System
In view of the life-time budget constraint (5) and the saving equation (12) , we see that
xt+1 = Rt+1 (wt − ct) = Rt+1kt+1. Thus from (9) it holds that
xt = Rkt. (13)
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By use of (9) , (10), (12) and (13), we may rewrite (7) as follows:
ct = (βR)
− 1σ+γθ(1−σ)
µ
Rkt
ct+1
¶− θ(1−σ)(1−γ)σ+γθ(1−σ)
Rkt+1.
Hence, denoting zt = ct/kt and Gt = kt+1/kt, we can rewrite the above equation as
zt = B(zt+1)
φG1+φt , (14)
where
B ≡ β
− 1σ+γθ(1−σ)
R
(σ−1)(1+θ−2γθ)
σ+γθ(1−σ)
, φ ≡ θ (1− σ) (1− γ)
γθ + (1− γθ)σ .
Equation (12) presents kt+1/kt ≡ Gt = (1− α)A− zt, and hence from (14) we obtain
zt+1 = B
− 1φ z
1
φ
t [(1− α)A− zt]
−
?
1+ 1φ
?
. (15)
This equation depicts the dynamic behavior of ratio between young agents’ consumption
and capital stock, zt (≡ ct/kt) .
3.2 Balanced-Growth Equilibrium
The balanced-growth equilibrium holds when ct and kt change at the same rate, so that
zt stays constant over time. First, note that if there is no consumption external effect, i.e.
φ = 0, (14) is written as zt = β−1/σR(σ−1)/σ [(1− α)A− zt]. Consequently, the gross rate
of capital accumulation in the absence of consumption externalities is given by
Gˆ =
(1− α)A.
1 +R(σ−1)/σβ−1/σ
. (16)
It is also to be noted that if there are only intragenerational external effects, i.e. θ 6= 0 and
γ = 1, then φ = 0 and B ≡ β
1
σ+θ(1−σ)R
(1−θ)(σ−1)
σ+θ(1−σ) . Thus the dynamic behavior of the
economy is the same as that without consumption externalities. The only difference is
that the balanced-growth rate in the presence of externalities is given by
GE =
(1− α)A.
1 +R
(1−θ)(σ−1)
σ+θ(1−σ) β−
1
σ+θ(1−σ)
. (17)
Comparing (17) with (16) , we find that the growth effect of intragenerational consumption
externalities depends on the parameter values. In the standard case where jealousy and
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conformism prevail (that is θ > 0 and σ > 1), as long as R ≥ 1 and 0 < β < 1, we find
the following7:
R
(1−θ)(σ−1)
σ+θ(1−σ) β−
1
σ+θ(1−σ) < R
σ−1
σ β−
1
σ , (18)
implying that GE > Gˆ. Similarly, if consumers have admiration as well as conformism
(i.e. θ < 0 and σ < 1), we also obtain (18) . As a result, in the absence of intertegenera-
tional externalities, introducing the consumers’ conformism yields the same effect as that
produced by an increase in the elasticity of intergenerational substitution in consumption,
1/σ. In contrast, if consumers are anti-conformists, i.e. θ (1− σ) > 0, then (18) fails to
hold and thus the economy with consumption externalities grows slower than the economy
without consumption externalities.8
In the general case where there are intergenerational consumption externalities, on the
balanced-growth path (15) gives
B−
1
1+θ−z
1−φ
1+φ = (1− α)A− z. (19)
It is easy to see that if (1− φ) / (1 + φ) > 0, then (19) has a unique solution for z ∈
7Note that (1−θ)(σ−1)σ+θ(1−σ) −
σ−1
σ =
θ(1−σ)
σ[σ+θ(1−σ)] and
1
σ+θ(1−σ) −
1
σ = −
θ(1−σ)
σ[σ+θ(1−σ)] . Hence, given the assump-
tions (4) , 0 < γ < 1, R > 1 and 0 < β < 1, we confirn that
sign
?
R
(1−θ)(σ−1)
σ+θ(1−σ) β−
1
σ+θ(1−σ) −R
σ−1
σ β−
1
σ
?
= sign θ (1− σ) .
8This result also holds for the case of representative agent economy. In the representative agent economy,
the household’s objective functional is given by
U =
∞?
t=0
βt
?
ctE
−θ
t
?1−σ
1− σ ,
where Et = ct holds in equilibrium. Given the same production structure, it is easy to see that the
balanced-growth rate in the representative economy with consumption externalities is
kt+1
kt
=
ct+1
ct
= (αAβ)
1
α+θ(1−σ) ,
in which it is assumed that αAβ > 1. Therefore, if the agents are conformists, i.e. θ (1− σ) < 0, then the
balanced-growth rate in the presence of consumption externalities is higher than that without externalities.
It is also to be noted that, as pointed out by Liu and Turnovsky (2005) and others, in the representative
agent economy, the balanced-growth path with externalities satisfies the social optimum condition. This
is because if the planner internalized the external effect so that it maximizes
?∞
t=0 β
t c
(1−σ)(1−θ)
t
1−σ , the
balanced-growth rate is the same as the above with external effects.
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(0, (1− α)A) . Conversely, if (1− φ) / (1 + φ) < 0 and if (19) has a solution, then there
are two feasible solutions at most: see Figures 1 (a) and (b). Hence, we conclude:
Proposition 1 There exists a unique, feasible balanced growth path if −1 < φ < 1. Oth-
erwise, there are two balanced-growth equilibria at most.
Given the restrictions in (4) , it is easy to confirm that if consumers’ preferences exhibit
jealousy and conformism (KUJ), i.e. θ > 0 and σ > 1, then it holds that −1 < φ < 0.
Therefore, under the standard assumptions on external effects, the balanced-growth path
is uniquely determined. If conformism is associated with admiration (θ < 0 and σ < 1),
then φ can be strictly less than −1, so that dual balanced-growth equilibria may exist. If
consumers are anti-conformists (i.e. θ (1− σ) > 0), φ has a positive value. In order to
hold φ < 1, we should assume that θ (1− σ) (1− 2γ)−σ < 0. Thus if γ > 1/2, then φ < 1.
If the intergenerational consumption external effects dominate so that γ < 1/2, we may
have φ > 1.
From (15) and (19) we see that
dzt+1
dzt
¯¯¯¯
zt=z
=
1
φ
+
µ
1 +
1
φ
¶
z
(1− α)A− z
=
1
φ
+
µ
1 +
1
φ
¶
B
1
1+φ z
2φ
1+φ .
Thus if 0 < φ < 1, then dzt+1/dzt > 1. If −1 < φ < 0, then dzt+1/dzt < −1. This
means that in both cases the dynamic system is unstable around the steady state. Since
zt (= ct/kt) is not a predetermined variable, local instability and uniqueness of the steady
state mean that the balanced-growth equilibrium is globally determinate and hence the
economy always stays on the balanced-growth path. Figures 2 (a) and (b) depict the cases
of 0 < φ < 1 and −1 < φ < 0, respectively. The figures show that the dynamic system
exhibits global determinacy for φ ∈ (−1, 1) .
When φ > 1, there may exist two steady states. As Figure 2 (c) shows, the steady state
with a lower z is stable and the other with a higher z is unstable. Hence, the balanced
growth path with a higher growth rate is locally indeterminate, while one with a lower
growth rate is locally determinate. If φ < −1, the graphical representation of (15) is given
by Figure 2 (d). This figure reveals that the steady state with a higher z again satisfies
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local determinacy, because it holds that −1 < 1/φ + (1 + 1/φ) z/ [(1− α)A− z] . In this
situation, both balanced-growth paths can be realized for any initial value of zt.
Summing up the above discussion, we obtain:
Proposition 2 If −1 < φ < 1, then the economy exhibits global determinacy. If φ > 1,
the balanced-growth equilibrium with a higher growth rate is locally in determinate, while
that with a lower growth rate is determinate. In the case of φ < −1, the balanced-growth
path with a lower growth rate is either locally determinate or indeterminate.
4 Growth and Bubbles
4.1 Equilibrium Dynamics with Bubbles
We now assume that the government issues non-interest-bearing asset. This asset is in-
trinsically worthless in the sense that it serves neither for consumption nor for production
activities. For convenience of exposition, we call this asset money. Since ’money’ in our
economy does not present any intratemporal transaction service, it may be called ’pure
asset bubbles’ as well.9 We assume that the initial old receives a given stock of money,
M0. Then they sell M0 to the young in period 1. We also assume that the government
changes money supply at a constant rate of μ− 1 in each period. Thus the nominal stock
of money supply changes according to
Mt+1 = μMt.
Note that if μ < 1, the government contracts money supply. We assume that the newly
created money is distributed to the young agents as lump-sum transfers. This means that
the flow budget constraint for the government is given by
Mt+1 −Mt = ptτ t,
9 If there is no capital, money can serve as a medium of intertemporal exchange. Since capital plays
a role of store of value, ’money’ in our economy may has a positive value only when the rate of return
dominance fails to hold, that is, the declining rate of price of money in terms of final goods equals the rate
of return to capital.
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where pt is the price of final goods in terms of money and τ t is the real transfer for the
young households (if τ t is negative, it represents a lump-sum tax levied on the young
generation). Letting mt =Mt/ktpt, the government’s budget constraint is expressed as
τ t = (μ− 1)mtkt. (20)
We have assumed that the newly created money is distributed to the young agents, so
that the budget constraint for the young is now replaced with
ct + st = wt + τ t. (21)
The saving of the young, st, is spent for physical capital investment and money holding,
and hence we obtain:10
st = kt+1 +
Mt+1
pt
. (22)
Since holding money does not bear interest income, the gross rate of return to money
holding, pt/pt+1, should be equal to the gross rate of return to capital:
pt
pt+1
= R. (23)
The real rate of return to capital is fixed under our assumption of Ak technology and thus
the rate of change in monetary price of goods stays constant over time. As a consequence,
from (23) the flow budget constraint for the t-th generation in their old age is xt+1 =
Rst = R (kt+1 +Mt+1/pt) . Again, the equilibrium condition for the final good market is
yt = ct+xt+ kt+1. Substituting yt = wt+Rkt, ct = wt+ τ t− st, xt = Rst−1 and (22) into
the commodity-market equilibrium condition, we obtain
wt +Rkt = wt + τ t −
µ
kt+1 +
Mt+1
pt
¶
+R
µ
kt +
Mt
pt−1
¶
+ kt+1.
Hence, by use of (20) , we find that the above equation yields mtkt = μRmt−1kt−1, which
10The young agents’ savings are used for investment and money holding. Since the young genration’s
money holding consists of the existing stock of money Mt plus newly distributed one, Mt+1−Mt, it holds
that
st = kt+1 +
Mt
pt
+
Mt+1 −Mt
pt
= kt+1 +
Mt+1
pt
.
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gives the following:11
mt+1 =
μR
Gt
mt. (24)
Difference equation (24) describes dynamics of the ratio of real money balances and capital.
In order to derive the motion of consumption-capital ratio, zt, we use (7) to derive
ct = (βR)
− 1σ+γθ(1−σ)
µ
xt
ct+1
¶−φ
xt+1. (25)
Substituting xt+1 = R(kt+1 +Mt+1/pt) and xt = R (kt +Mt/pt−1) into the above and
arranging the terms, we obtain
ct
kt
≡ zt = B
µ
kt +Mt/pt−1
ct+1
¶−φ
(Gt + μmt) ,
where (kt +Mt/pt−1) /ct+1 can be expressed as
kt +Mt/pt−1
ct+1
=
1
zt+1Gt
+mt
pt
pt−1
kt
kt+1
kt+1
ct+1
=
1
zt+1Gt
³
1 +
mt
R
´
.
Hence, we express (25) as follows:
zt = B
∙
1
zt+1Gt
³
1 +
mt
R
´¸−φ
(Gt + μmt) . (26)
From (20) , (21) and (22) , the gross rate of capital accumulation is given by
kt+1
kt
≡ Gt = (1− α)A−mt − zt. (27)
Using (26) and (27) , we obtain:
zt+1 = B
− 1φ z
1
φ
t
³
1 +
mt
R
´ [(1− α)A+ (μ− 1)mt − zt]− 1φ
[(1− α)A−mt − zt]
, (28)
which describes the motion of zt (= ct/kt) .
The dynamic equations (24) and (27) yield:
mt+1 =
μRmt
(1− α)A−mt − zt
. (29)
To sum up, a complete dynamic system with consumption externalities is presented by a
pair of difference equations (28) and (29) . Notice that if mt = 0 for all t ≥ 0, our dynamic
system reduces to (15) which depicts the dynamics of the bubble-free economy.
11Dynamic equation (24) can be directly derived by manipulating (23) and using the definition of mt,
However, it does not come from the definition of variable but from the equilibrium and optimization
conditions as shown in the main text.
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4.2 Balanced-Growth Characterization in the Absence of Consumption
Externalities
First, let us review the main results obtained in the model without consumption exter-
nalities. Since it holds that φ = 0 in the absence of consumption external effects, (28)
reduces to
zt =
β−1/σR(σ−1)/σ
1 + β−1/σR(σ−1)/σ
[A (1− α)−mt].
Substituting the above into (27) presents
Gt =
A (1− α)
1 + β−1/σR(σ−1)/σ
−mt. (30)
By use of the above and (24), we obtain:
mt+1 =
μRmth
A(1−α)
1+β−1/σR(σ−1)/σ
−mt
i .
Since the balanced-growth rate in the absence of bubble is given by (16) , the motion of
mt is described by
mt+1 =
μRmt
Gˆ−mt
. (31)
The dynamic equation (31) shows that there may exist two steady states: the non-
monetary steady state with m = 0 and the monetary steady state with a positive level of
m.
If money supply is constant (μ = 1), then (31) becomes
mt+1 =
Rmt
Gˆ−mt
.
As claimed by Grossman and Yanagawa (1993), the existence of balanced-growth equilib-
rium with a positive, steady-state value of mt requires that
dmt+1
dmt
¯¯¯¯
mt=0
=
R
Gˆ
< 1. (32)
Namely, the economy has a balanced-growth path that sustains bubbles if Gˆ > R (= αA) ,
i.e. the balanced-growth rate of the bubble-free economy exceeds the real interest rate. In
addition, equation (30) means that if μ = 1, then Gt = Gˆ−m and Gt = R. Therefore, the
balanced-growth path with bubbles attains a lower steady-growth rate than that realized
in the economy without bubbles.
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If μ 6= 1, the necessary and sufficient condition for the presence of sustainable bubble
in the balanced-growth equilibrium is:
dmt+1
dmt
¯¯¯¯
mt=0
=
μR
Gˆ
< 1.
This means that the equilibrium with bubble can be sustained in the steady state if and
only if
Gˆ > μR. (34)
As a result, when μ < 1 so that the government contracts the nominal stock of money, there
exists a feasible steady state with bubbles even if the balanced-growth rate in the bubble-
free economy, Gˆ, is strictly lower than the real interest rate, R. Futagami and Shibata
(1999) confirm this result in the context of an infinitely-lived overlapping generations
model with population growth. Note that from R = αA and (16) the existence condition
(34) is fulfilled if the parameters involved in the model satisfy
1
μ
>
α
1− α
h
1 + β−
1
σ (αA)
σ−1
σ
i
. (35)
In our simple setting, (35) is the necessary and sufficient condition for the presence of
steady state with asset bubbles.
Condition (34) means that the non-monetary steady-state where mt = 0 is locally
stable, while the monetary steady state with a positive m is locally unstable. Therefore,
the monetary balanced-growth path locally satisfies determinacy of equilibrium and the
non-monetary balanced-growth path holds local indeterminacy. Since the initial level of
mt (=Mt/ktpt) is not predetermined, the economy exhibits global indeterminacy.12
4.3 Effects of Consumption Externalities
When discussing the effects of consumption externalities in our setting, we should point
out again that if there are no intergenerational externalities, the main conclusion shown
in Section 4.2 still holds. As was pointed out in Section 4.2, if asset bubbles emerge
in an economy without consumption externalities, the balanced-growth rate should be
12The global indeterminacy means that in each moment the economy may stay either at the monetary
steady state or at the non-monetary steady state. In addition, the economy can be on a transition path
that converges to the non-monetary steady state.
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lower than one sustained in the corresponding bubble-free economy. This is because the
balanced-growth rate in the bubble economy is μR and the necessary and sufficient con-
dition for sustaining bubbles in the long-run equilibrium is Gˆ > μR. In words, a part
of saving is used for purchasing money (bubbles) rather than capital so that capital for-
mation is inevitably decreased. Such a conclusion holds in the presence of consumption
externalities as well, if the external effects are only intragenerational. If there is no in-
tergenerational externalities (γ = 1), it is easy to show that the dynamic behavior of the
economy is summarized as
mt+1 =
μRmt
GE −mt
,
where GE is given by (17) . Therefore, the necessary and sufficient condition for sustaining
a steady state with bubbles is GE > μR, implying that the bubbly steady state attains a
lower rate of balanced growth than that in the bubble-free economy.
In the general case where both intragenerational and intergenerational externalities ex-
ist, from (28) and (29) the balanced-growth path in the presence of bubbles is characterized
by the following conditions:
z1−
1
φ = B−
1
φ
³
1 +
m
R
´ [(1− α)A+ (μ− 1)m− z]− 1φ
[(1− α)A−m− z] , (36)
(1− α)A−m− z = μR, (37)
where z and m respectively denote the steady-state values of zt and mt. Equations (36)
and (37) can be combined in the following manner:
(1− α)A−m− μR = B−
1
φ−1 (μR)−
φ
φ−1
³
1 +
m
R
´ φ
φ−1
[μR+ μm]−
1
φ−1 .
This equation gives the steady-state value of m:
m =
(1− α)A− μR−B−
1
φ−1 (μR)−
φ+1
φ−1
1 +B−
1
φ−1μ−
φ+1
φ−1R−
2φ
φ−1
. (38)
Using (37) and (38) , we obtain the steady-state value of z:
z =
B−
1
φ−1μ−
φ+1
φ−1R−
2φ
φ−1 [(1− α)A+R− μR]
1 +B−
1
φ−1μ−
φ+1
φ−1R−
2φ
φ−1
. (39)
Thus a feasible balanced-growth path with a positivem exists if the numerator of the right
hand side of the above equation has a positive value, which is given by
μaA+B−
1
φ−1 (μαA)−
φ+1
φ−1 < (1− α)A, (40)
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where B ≡ β
− 1σ+γθ(1−σ)
(αA)
(σ−1)(1+θ−2γθ)
σ+γθ(1−σ)
. Equation (39) shows that z has a positive value
if (1− α)A+R− μR = A− μαA > 0, which is fulfilled under (40) . It is also to be noted
that when θ = 0 (so that φ = 0), condition (40) reduces to (35) . To sum up, we have
shown:
Proposition 3 If (40) is statisfied, there is a unique, feasible balanced growth equilibrium
with bubbles.
When there are intergenerational external effects in consumption, introducing bubbles
does not always lower the balanced-growth rate. To see this, first note that the steady-state
condition in the bubble-free economy given by (19) and G = (1− α)A− z present
G = (1− α)A−B
1
1−φG
1+φ
1−φ ,
which determines the balanced-growth rate of the real economy with intergenerational and
intragenerational consumption externalities. Define
F (G) = G+B
1
1−φG
1+φ
1−φ − (1− α)A. (41)
Then the balanced-growth rate without bubbles is a solution of F (G) = 0. Proposition
1 states that if φ ∈ (−1, 1), then F (G) = 0 has a unique positive solution. Additionally,
F (G) is monotonically increasing in G for φ ∈ (−1, 1): see Figure 3 (a). Remember that in
the case of constant money supply the balanced-growth rate with bubbles is μR(= μαA).
We find that under the existence condition (40) the following holds:
F (μαA) = μαA+B−
1
φ−1 (μαA)
1+φ
1−φ − (1− α)A < 0.
This means that the balanced-growth rate with bubble is strictly less than that attained
in the bubble-free economy.
If φ /∈ [−1, 1] and if there are two steady states, the graph of F (G) is like Figure
3 (b). The figure indicates that the balanced-growth rate of the economy with bubbles
is in between the two growth rates attained in the long-run equilibrium without bubbles.
Therefore, if the economy without bubbles stays on the balanced-growth path with a lower
growth rate, the emergence of bubbles may raise the long-term growth rate. Conversely,
20
if the initial position is the steady state with a higher growth rate, as in the standard
case, introducing bubble reduces the balanced growth rare. As a consequence, we have
confirmed the following:
Proposition 4 If φ ∈ (−1, 1), the balanced-growth rate with bubbles is lower than that
attained in the bubble-free economy. If φ /∈ [−1, 1] , the balanced-growth rate in the presence
of bubbles is higher (resp. lower) than that of the corresponding bubble-free economy staying
on the steady state with a lower (resp. higher) growth rate.
The above proposition indicates that the welfare implication of bubbles may be differ-
ent from that obtained in the standard models without consumption externalities. In the
standard setting the economy with bubbles yields a lower balanced-growth rate than in the
bubble-free economy, and hence the emergence of bubbles cannot be Pareto improving.
Namely, except for the initial old whose welfare is increased by receiving money which
can be sold to the young, all the subsequent generations obtain lower utilities due to a
permanent reduction in the growth rate of consumption. By contrast, in our model with
intergenerational consumption externalities, in the case of dual steady-states the emer-
gence of bubbles may raise the balanced growth rate, implying that the existence of asset
bubbles can be Pareto improving in the sense that all the generation can attain higher
welfare when bubbles emerge.
It is also worth emphasizing that intergenerational consumption externalities may af-
fect the dynamic behavior of the economy. As mentioned in Section 4.2, either if there is no
consumption externality or if there is only intragenerational external effect, the bubble-
free steady state is locally indeterminate, while the steady state with bubbles satisfies
local determinacy. If there are intergenerational consumption externalities, then dynamic
system involves two state variables, mt (=Mt/ptkt) and zt (= ct/kt) . Since both price pt
and consumption ct are unpredetermined variable in the perfect-foresight equilibrium, we
cannot specify the initial values of mt and zt. In this sense, the dynamic system exhibits
global indeterminacy, because every point in the feasible region of mt- zt space can be
an equilibrium. In addition, if we focus on the local behavior of the economy near the
balanced-growth path, the local determinacy of a balanced-growth equilibrium requires
that the dynamic equation system consisting of (28) and (29) satisfies total instability
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near the steady state solution. Otherwise, the steady-equilibrium exhibits either a saddle
point or a sink so that there are a continuum of converging path around the bakanced-
growth path. Hence, there may exist expectation-driven, sunspot-type fluctuations near
these long-run equilibrium with local indeterminacy.
The above argument means that if φ ∈ (−1, 1) so that there is a unique bubble-
free (i.e. m = 0) steady state, the economy can stay at the bubble-free or at the bubbly
balanced path or on a transitional path towards the steady state that is either a saddle
point or a sink. Similarly, if φ /∈ [−1, 1] and there are two steady states without bubbles,
the economy may reach one of three steady states: one with bubbles and other two without
bubbles. In any case, the equilibrium path is globally indeterminate. We thus arrive the
following:
Proposition 5 In the case of φ ∈ (−1, 1) , there are one bubble free and one bubbly
balanced-growth paths. If φ /∈ [−1, 1] , the economy involves three balanced-growth paths at
most: one is associated with bubbles and other two are bubble free. Regardless of the value
of φ, the economy exhibits global indeterminacy of equilibrium.
Finally, we should point out that the main results presented so far are established under
the assumption of constant money growth. If money supply is endogenously determined,
the balanced-grwoth rate in the presence of bubbles is not simply given by the constant
value of μR. As for a simple example, suppose that newly created money is not distributed
to the young agents but the government consumes final goods by financing printing money.
The government budget constraint is now replaced with
Mt+1 −Mt = ptγYt, 0 < γ < 1,
where γ denotes the government’s conumption share of income. In this case the gross
growth rate of nomonal money stock is
μt = 1 +
γA
mt
.
Since (23) should be satisfied and since mt stays constant in the steady state, the balanced
grwoth rate is given by G = μR =
³
1 + γAm
´
αA. The balanced grwoth rate now depends
on the steady-state value of m which may be affected by the presence of consumption
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externalities. In fact, in this simple money supply regime, we can show that the balanced-
growth equilibrum with bubbles may not be uniquely determined and that the balaned
growth rate is directly linked to the degree of consumption externalities.13
5 Conclusion
In the context of a simple model of endogenous growth, this paper has addressed eco-
nomic implication of consumption externalities in an overlapping generations economy. In
particular, we have focused on the existence of sustainable asset bubbles in the long-run
growth equilibrium. The main finding of our study is that the presence of intergenerational
consumption externalities may play a relevant role. If the consumption external effects
are intragenerational alone, that is, each generation are concerned with other agents’ con-
sumption behaviors in the same cohort, then the external effects are only quantitative
ones. Thus in this case growth and welfare implications of bubbles are essentially the
same as those obtained in the economy without consumption externalities. We have, how-
ever, shown that if the intergenertaional external effect in consumption exist, the growth
and welfare effects of bubbles could be considerably different from these established in the
absence of bubbles. Our discussion has demonstrated that consumption externalities may
yield more fundamental effects on the equilibrium dynamics and policy implication in dy-
namic economy with overlapping generations than in the representative-agent economies.
In this paper, we have analyzed a stylized model with or without non-fundamental
asset bubbles. It is interesting to extend our analytical framework to discuss more gen-
eral situations such that money also serves for intratemporal transactions, labor supply
is endogenously determined14 and that bubbles may be related to fundamentals15. Ad-
ditionally, introducing the interest-bearing government debt into our model would be a
useful extension.
13 In the context of a continuous-time OLG model, Mino and Shibata (2000) show that the simple
endogenous money supply rule mentioned above may generate multiple balanced growth paths.
14For example, Mino and Shibata (2000) analyze an endogenously growing OLG model in which money
is introduced in the form of money-in-the utility function. Itaya and Mino (2005) examine the relation
between preference structure and monetary growth. Adding consumption externalities to those frameworks
would yield richer results than those obtained in our model of pure bubble.
15See, for example, Ventura (2005).
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Figure 1: Existence of Balanced-Growth Equilibrium
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